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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
that the proponents of the will had assumed and carried the bur-
den of proving the ability of the testatrix to read. Under the evi-
dence adduced upon the trial of the case it appears that the court
might well have affirmed the lower court's decision that the
testatrix did not have the ability to read at the time the will was
confected.2 1 In view of the fact that the Supreme Court will
usually accept a lower court's findings on questions of fact where
the credibility of witnesses is involved,29 the instant decision may
be indicative of a liberal attitude toward the statutory require-
ment that a testator have the ability to read in order to make use
of the new wills act.
Since the comparatively few formal requirements imposed by
the new wills act are devised to prevent fraudulent practices, it
appears that they should be rigidly enforced. However, when
there is no indication of fraud, such as in the instant case, it is
felt that the court may properly take a more liberal attitude as
to the weight of conflicting evidence in construing the formal
requirements of a testament.
Hugh T. Ward
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ABSTENTION
APPLIED TO CIVIL RIGHTS CASE
Declaratory and injunctive relief were sought in a three-judge
federal district court' convened to hear constitutional challenges
to five Virginia segregation laws.2  Federal jurisdiction was
28. See notes 2 and 3 8upra.
29. See, e.g., Orlando v. Polito, 228 La. 846, 84 So.2d 433 (1955).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1952) provides that the following factors will necessitate
the convening of a three-judge court: (1) injunctive relief must be requested;
(2) plaintiff must ask that state officers be restrained from enforcing a state
statute or an order of a state administrative agency; (3) the contention must be
made that the statute or order violates the Federal Constitution. The fact that a
three-judge court always sits as a court of equity has enabled the doctrines of
equitable discretions to enter the picture. See MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE
JUDICIAL CODE 51-54 (1949) ; Comment, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 813 (1959).
2. 4 VA. CODE §§ 18-349.9-18-349.37 (Supp. 1958); 7 VA. CODE §§ 54-74,
54-78, 54-79 (1958).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1952) : "Civil Rights and Elective Franchise
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person;
"(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of
the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United Staes, by any
act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42;
"(2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in
preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowl-
edge were about to occur and power to prevent;
[Vol. XX
1960] NOTES
based upon the civil rights statutes,3 diversity of citizenship,4
and ordinary federal question jurisdiction. 5 Three of the Vir-
ginia laws were found to be unconstitutional, the court retaining
jurisdiction as to the other two acts but refusing to pass on their
validity until they could be construed by the courts of the state.
On appeal by the State of Virginia to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed, three Justices dissenting. The three stat-
utes found to be unconstitutional are not so clearly violative of
the Constitution that a state court interpretation might not avoid
in whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudi-
cation, or at least materially change the nature of the federal
question. The district court should have postponed decision as
to the constitutionality of these laws pending a state court inter-
pretation thereof. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
The doctrine of equitable abstention, expressed by the Court
in the instant case, is one of the principal court-created means
for limiting the exercise of federal jurisdiction to enjoin state
action. 6 The leading case establishing this doctrine is Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,7 wherein the Court advanced
as a basis for postponing the exercise of jurisdiction pending
action in the state courts the policy of avoiding constitutional
adjudication whenever possible, as well as the potentiality for
"(3) To redress the deprivation under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States;
"(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote."
The substantive law provisions applicable are 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1952).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952).
5. Id. § 1331.
6. In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 12 (1908), the Court held that a suit to
enjoin a state official from acting in a manner alleged to violate the Federal Con-
stitution is not subject to an eleventh amendment objection, and therefore is not
excluded from the federal judicial power. Since that decision a series of federal
statutes have imposed restraints on the power of the district courts to issue in-
junctions against state action. Two of the most important of these were the
Johnson Act of 1934, which applies to injunctions against state regulatory agen-
cies, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1952), and the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C.
§1341 (1952).
Some judicially-created devices which have limited the power of the federal
courts to enjoin state action include the rule that equity will not act if there is an
adequate remedy at law, Boyce's Ex'rs v. Grundy, 28 U.S. 210 (1830) ; the rule
that equity will not ordinarily enjoin criminal proceedings, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S.
200 (1888) ; and the equitable abstention doctrine.
7. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The Pullman decision was not the first in which the
abstention device had been used (see Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176
(1935) ; Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933) ; Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid
Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929)), but it was the first in which an unequivocal
statement of the doctrine appeared, and is generally cited as the leading case for the
doctrine.
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friction between the federal and the state judiciary inherent in
striking down state action. The Court's statement of the absten-
tion doctrine in the Pullman case sets out the major factors
generally considered by the courts in determining the appropri-
ateness of abstention in cases involving a federal constitutional
question.8 On the other hand, in cases where an injunction
against state action is sought and no federal constitutional ques-
tion is present, the applicability of the abstention doctrine will
depend upon such factors as the lack of federal court equipment
to deal with complex state regulatory schemes, and generally
upon the desirability of avoiding potential federal-state friction.0
In the non-constitutional cases where equitable abstention is
deemed appropriate, the practice of the federal courts generally
is to dismiss the action. 10 In the constitutional abstention cases,
the general rule is that federal action will be stayed, but the fed-
eral court will retain jurisdiction over the federal question pend-
ing a state court's settlement of the interwoven questions of state
law.".
Something of an exception to the general rule of applicability
of the equitable abstention doctrine in cases where a federal con-
stitutional question is interwoven with an unsettled question of
state law may be seen in recent decisions in the lower federal
courts involving deprivations of personal liberties. Examination
of some of these decisions indicates that where the federal cause
of action is based upon deprivation of a party's civil rights, the
federal courts have been somewhat reluctant to apply the absten-
tion doctrine. 12 In some of these cases the refusal to abstain was
based upon concern for the peculiar urgency in securing a fed-
8. See City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959) ;
Government & Civic Employees Organizing Committee, CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S.
364 (1957); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Govern-
ment & Civic Employees Organizing Committee, CIO v. Windsor, 347 U.S. 901
(1954) ; Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); Shipman v. Du Pre, 339
U.S. 321 (1950) ; Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949) ; AFL
v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946) ; Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325
U.S. 450 (1945); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101
(1944) ; Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942).
9. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959) ; Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) ; Stefanelli v. Minard,
342 U.S. 117 (1951) ; Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Southern R.R., 341 U.S. 341
(1951) ; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) ; Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
10. See note 9 supra.
11. See note 8 supra. One exception to this rule is the case of Stainback v.
Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949), where dismissal of the complaint,
rather than retention, was ordered.
12. Romero v. Weakley, 226 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1955), reversing 131 F. Supp.
818 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ; Westminster School District v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th
Cir. 1947); Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Morris v. Williams,
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eral determination of a party's civil rights. 13 In others, it ap-
pears that the courts have been willing to exercise their jurisdic-
tion without regard to the abstention doctrine once it has been
determined that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply.14 In still others, the courts have exer-
cised their jurisdiction without any discussion of their reasons
for not abstaining. 5
The instant case appears to clear up much of the confusion
exhibited by the lower courts on the question of the applicability
of the abstention doctrine in a civil liberties case.16 Under this
holding, it seems that hereafter the same determination of the
abstention issue will be appropriate in cases involving civil rights
as is exercised in other constitutional abstention cases. There
has been criticism of this holding as running counter to the
clearly expressed intention of Congress in enacting the civil
rights legislation, on which jurisdiction herein was predicated,
to have a speedy effective determination of a party's civil rights
in the federal courts. 7 The dissent in the instant case makes a
149 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.
1956), aff'd mem., 352 U.S. 903 (1956) ; Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp.
220 (D. Hawaii 1956) ; Heard v. Ouachita Parish School Board, 94 F. Supp. 897
(W.D. La. 1951) ; Alesna v. Rice, 74 F. Supp. 865 (D. Hawaii 1947), reversed,
172 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1949); Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan.
1945), appeal dismissed sub. nom., McElroy v. Mitchell, 326 U.S. 690 (1945);
Mills v. Board of Education, 30 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1939). Contra: Williams
v. Dalton, 231 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1956) ; Carson v. Board of Education, 227 F.2d
789 (4th Cir. 1955) ; Dawley v. Norfolk, 159 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Va. 1958),
affirmed, 260 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1958);
Lassiter v. Taylor, 152 F. Supp. 295 (E.D.N.C. 1957) ; Catoggio v. Grogan, 149
F. Supp. 94 (D. N.J. 1957); Bryan v. Austin, 148 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. S.C.
1957), vacated as moot, 354 U.S. 933 (1957) ; Robinson v. Board of Education,
143 F. Supp. 481 (D. Md. 1956).
13. Romero v. Weakley, 226 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Browder v. Gayle, 142
F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), aff'd mem., 352 U.S. 903 (1956) ; Alesna v. Rice,
74 F. Supp. 865 (D. Hawaii 1947) ; Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D.
Kan. 1945).
14. Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1946).
15. Westminster School District v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947);
Morris v. Williams, 149 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1945); Heard v. Ouachita Parish
School Board, 94 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. La. 1951) ; Mills v. Board of Education, 50
F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1939).
16. The instant case is the first expression by the Supreme Court on this
question since the Pullman case (312 U.S. 496 (1941)), wherein Justice Frank-
furter, speaking for the Court, stated that the case "touches a sensitive area of
social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alterna-
tive . . . is open." This language was directed at the complaint of the Pullman
porters, intervenors in the case, who were alleging that an order of the Texas
Railroad Commission violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Pullman case, however, has not been considered a civil rights
case, and has not been cited as authority in civil rights cases, presumably because
the chief complaint in the case was by the Pullman Company, who were alleging
that the Railroad Commission's order amounted to a deprivation of property
without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.
17. See Comment, 14 RUTGERs L. REV. 185 (1959).
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strong argument against the exercise of abstention in a civil
rights case, especially where the statutes being questioned are
expressions of "a state policy that seeks to undermine paramount
federal law." ' The majority opinion does not comment on this
point, other than to state that "we are unable to agree that the
terms of these three statutes leave no reasonable room for a
construction by the Virginia courts which might avoid in whole
or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication,
or at least materially change the nature of the problem."'19
There is language in the opinion of the instant case which
gives rise to speculation as to some further significance of the
case. The Court indicates that it will not come to grips with the
question of the constitutionality of a state statute until it has
become "a complete product of the state. ' 20 Presumably a statute
is never a "complete product of the state" until it has been con-
strued by the courts of the state.2 1 If this is what is meant by
this language, it is possible that the instant case represents an
extension of the abstention doctrine, since the mere fact that the
state courts have not construed a statute apparently has not been
a sufficient basis for applying the abstention policy in prior
cases. 22 Assuming that this fact is henceforth to be accorded
more weight than formerly in the determination of whether
abstention is appropriate, it might well dictate the exercise of
abstention where the doctrine has hitherto not been applied. For
example, it is generally understood that abstention is not ap-
propriate in a case where the federal constitutional challenge is
levelled at the vagueness and breadth of a state statute pro-
scribing speech, whether or not the statute has ever been given
a state court construction, since the issue raised is whether the
statute is invalid on its face. But under the "complete product
of the state" language, it is arguable that such a statute might
be sent back in order to give the state court an opportunity to
pass on the question of constitutionality.
Clearly the instant case stands for the proposition that the
doctrine of equitable abstention applies in civil rights cases, the
same considerations to be applicable in determining the appro-
priateness of abstention in these cases as in other cases involving
18. 360 U.S. 167, 184 (1959).
19. Id. at 177.
20. Id. at 178.
21. Ibid. The Court stated that a complete product of the state is "the enact-
ment as phrased by its legislature and as construed by its highest court."
22. See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
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federal constitutional questions. While such a decision may be
desirable from the standpoint of uniformity of the law, and while
it may follow logically from statements of the abstention doctrine
found in many of the cases, it is the view of this writer that the
dissent's argument that the civil rights legislation takes this
case out of the general rule has not been met. The dissenting
opinion points out that since the equitable abstention doctrine
arose in the Pullman case, it has been extended so far as to have
become a delaying tactic, both expensive and frustrating. Apart
from regional connotations, there is some merit to the views of
one writer that applying the abstention doctrine in cases like the
instant case "gives utterance to the very legal discord which the
[civil rights] statutes were enacted to silence. '23
David W. Robertson
LABOR LAW - POWER OF THE ARBITRATOR TO AWARD DAMAGES
Plaintiff union brought an action for specific enforcement
of an agreement to arbitrate, which was treated as an action for
a declaratory judgment interpreting a provision in the collective
bargaining agreement with defendant employer calling for arbi-
tration of differences in the interpretation or performance of
the agreement. Defendant had assigned an employee overtime
work which plaintiff contended should have been assigned to
another employee. Plaintiff demanded that the aggrieved em-
ployee receive premium pay for the work unjustly denied him.
Defendant refused to pay him on the ground of a company policy
of "no work-no pay," but did offer to let him work four hours
at his convenience, for which he would receive premium pay.
Plaintiff refused this offer and requested arbitration. Defendant
agreed on condition the arbitration be limited to a determination
of whether there had been a violation of the agreement, without
formulating a remedy. The agreement was silent as to the ar-
bitrator's power to award damages or penalties for misassign-
ment of overtime, although other sections provided for remedies.'
23. See Comment, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 185, 191 (1959).
1. E.g., Section 14 dealing with vacations; Section 15 dealing with pay for
those on jury duty; Section 16 dealing with severance pay; Section 17 dealing
with annuities; Section 18 dealing with funeral leaves. The district court said:
"In these clauses [enumerated above] there is language to be applied for determin-
ing an appropriate remedy, e.g., if there is a dispute as to whether or not a certain
employee qualifies for a vacation without pay, the arbitrator certainly has the right
to order the company to give the employee a two weeks' vacation with pay." Re-
finery Employees v. Continental Oil Co., 160 F. Supp. 723, n. 4 (W.D. La. 1958).
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